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Abstract
Reserve requirements, as a tool of macroprudential policy, have been increasingly employed since
the outbreak of the great financial crisis. We conduct an analysis of the effect of reserve require-
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making use of Bayesian model averaging methods. Regulation has on average a negative effect on
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1 Introduction
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, central banks have employed a wide variety of macro-
prudential instruments to strongly differing degrees. These instruments were often introduced without
much prior empirical evidence on their potential effects. The main aim of this study is to provide ro-
bust inference on the medium to long-run effects of reserve requirements, one of the most widespread
macroprudential measures, on credit growth and economic growth. To ensure robustness to model
specification, we use Bayesian model averaging techniques to quantify the role played by reserve re-
quirements. Our main interest lies in quantifying the real growth effects of reserve requirements as
a regulatory (macroprudential policy) tool during normal and stress times. Reserve requirements
are not the only existing macroprudential policy instrument1. Our paper contributes to a growing
empirical literature that aims to identify the effects of these instruments (see Aizenman et al., 2017;
Richter et al., 2018, for two very recent examples). Although the interest of researchers in assessing
the macroeconomic effects of reserve requirements has increased enormously after the crisis, their use
has a long history in economic policy, having been first established in the US at the national level in
1863 (Feinman, 1993) and used extensively in emerging markets and developing economies over the
last half a century (Federico et al., 2014).2
The main objective of macroprudential policy is to promote the resilience of the financial system
(Schoenmaker, 2014). This is important because financial risk taking may not always be beneficial
for economic growth. On the one hand, financial risk taking has been found to have – on average –
a positive effect on growth by mitigating financial bottlenecks (Rancière et al., 2008). On the other
hand, this may not be true to the same extent for countries with strong and sound institutions or for
extremely high levels of risk. Financial crises as an undesired outcome of systemic risk taking can
have severe adverse consequences for the financial system and the real economy (Laeven and Valencia,
2013). To maximize welfare, a balance therefore needs to be struck between financial stability and
some (systemic) risk taking (Borio and Shim, 2007).
A variety of theoretical papers have evaluated costs and benefits of regulation. Statements on the
most efficient approach usually depend on the setup of the economy and modeled frictions (Jeanne
and Korinek, 2013; Benigno et al., 2013). The assessment of the effects of macroprudential instruments
in empirical studies has – in comparison – not kept pace. The first generation of empirical studies on
macroprudential instruments and their effects uses aggregate measures in international panel studies,
for example by creating simple indices identifying the legal existence of these instruments (Borio and
Shim, 2007; Cerutti et al., 2017). The focus of these studies – influenced by the recent financial crisis
– has mostly been on measuring the effect on credit growth and house prices. Due to the use of
variables based on legal existence, the intensity of an instrument is never a factor in these studies.
This problem is addressed in a second group of studies, which employ either microeconomic or time-
series analysis to identify the effects of the strengthening of one instrument in a single country (Tovar
et al., 2012; Arregui et al., 2013; Camors and Peydro, 2014). In general, both types of studies agree
1See the extensive database of Cerutti et al. (2017) on the legal existence of different tools.
2Especially in these countries, reserve requirements are used as a form of capital controls. An extensive literature
examines costs and benefits of capital controls (see for example Chinn and Ito, 2006; Forbes, 2007), although not with
a focus on the potential benefits during a banking crisis. We control for the strength of total capital controls in our
estimations.
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that macroprudential instruments have countercyclical effects on credit and house price growth found
in the first group of studies mentioned above.
The theoretical literature on the link between reserve requirements and economic growth highlights
several mechanisms that imply beneficial effects in terms of smoothing cyclical volatility in the short
and medium term. In the short term, the reaction of real activity to changes in reserve requirements has
been highlighted in different studies both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical framework in
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), for instance, expands the standard IS-LM model to include bank reserves
as a policy instrument. The analysis shows that reserve requirements can indeed act as a stabilizing
device for short-term fluctuations, a result that is confirmed in the empirical results of Loungani and
Rush (1995).
Theoretical and empirical results on the long-run effects of reserve requirements are rare in the lit-
erature, and our contribution aims precisely to provide robust empirical results on the link between
reserve requirements, credit and real activity beyond the short-run horizons usually employed in the
existing econometric studies. Exceptions to the lack of theoretical modeling exercises based on longer-
run macroeconomic effects of reserve requirements on real activity are the works of Gomis-Porqueras
(2002) or Ma (2018). Gomis-Porqueras (2002) shows that imposing reserve requirements may increase
welfare in equilibrium under certain parametric assumptions due to changes in bank asset alloca-
tions, which affect capital accumulation and therefore long-run real output. Ma (2018) presents an
endogenous growth model where the productivity process is affected by potentially binding collateral
constraints and where the social planner can choose an optimal macropolicy path based on setting a
tax on capital flows. It is precisely the interpretation of reserve requirements as a tax on capital flows
(see Reinhart and Reinhart, 1999; Magud et al., 2018) that allows the interpretation of the predic-
tions of the theoretical model in Ma (2018) as providing testable hypotheses on the effects of reserve
requirements on income growth. The results of the model predict an ambiguous impact of macropru-
dential policy on economic growth, with positive effects during crises through its effect on financial
vulnerabilities and negative effects during tranquil periods. We are, to the best of our knowledge, the
first to test if these theoretical predictions hold empirically.
In this contribution, we aim to address empirically the role played by one particular macroprudential
instrument, reserve requirements, as a determinant of credit and economic growth beyond the usual
business cycle frequencies used in previous studies. We aim to identify the medium to long-run effect
of reserve requirements on credit and GDP per capita growth in the context of economic growth
regressions under the presence of model uncertainty, using Bayesian methods. Both the focus on a
longer horizon and an extension to GDP growth are aimed at bringing our study more in-line with
the welfare-maximizing objective of forward-looking policymakers. The Bayesian analysis has the
additional advantage in that it does not presuppose a particular econometric specification to address
the effect of reserve requirements on income growth for the sample. In particular, the method creates
weighted averages of the effects found across different model specifications. Using posterior model
probabilities as weights, it integrates away the uncertainty embodied in the choice of a particular
model. Thus it provides inference that accounts for the fact that the true specification is unknown to
the researcher. The advantages of such a method depend on the set of models entertained, so we place
an emphasis on collecting a dataset that includes the most relevant variables employed in the literature
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to assess differences in long-run economic growth. Moreover, we address potential nonlinearities by
allowing for quadratic and interaction effects in the models used.
Our estimations show that reserve requirements affect medium- to long-run GDP growth negatively
at all times, but that higher requirements during crises improve growth prospectives after the crisis
beyond the usual catching up. These results are robust across different horizons. We show that both
the negative single effect, and the positive interaction effects of requirements and crises are stronger
if requirements are either differentiated, or take on extremely high or low values.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of the
relation of crises, regulation and growth. Section 3 and 4 describe the data and Bayesian model
averaging techniques employed in the empirical exercise. Section 5 presents the results of the analysis,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The existing theoretical and empirical literature provides evidence that both economic crises and
reserve requirements can impact long-run growth developments. Treating these variables as having an
impact exclusively at cyclical frequencies and excluding them as potential determinants of long-run
economic growth would thus blur the actual mechanisms of interest when assessing their effect. This
section gives an overview over the existing literature on the relation between GDP growth, crises and
reserve requirements. We also touch on credit growth as one of the predominant objects of interest
for macroprudential policy.
In the empirical literature, there is considerable disagreement on the short to medium-run welfare
effects of financial crises, our first variable of interest. On the one hand, crises lead to large output
losses relative to pre-crisis output growth, which could be either temporary (as found by Laeven
and Valencia, 2013) or even permanent (as argued by Cerra and Saxena, 2008). On the other hand,
Devereux and Dwyer (2016) argue that output losses should be calculated relative to pre-crisis output
levels rather than to a trend, because the latter is hard to establish for volatile (and crisis-prone)
middle-income countries. They find that a large share of countries experience output growth even
during a crisis. Therefore, the welfare implications are unclear. One reason for this disagreement
is that crises have different origins and trigger long and protracted adjustment processes. These
structural adjustment processes can affect GDP growth for even longer than five years in the future.
Again, there is not much agreement on this channel. On the one hand, persistence would point to a
continuing negative effect on both credit and GDP growth (Bordo et al., 2010). On the other hand,
standard macroeconomic models would predict stronger growth after a crisis, as the economy moves
slowly back to its long-run growth path.
From a theoretical perspective, financial crises can be seen as consequences of frictions on financial
markets. With an eye on middle-income countries, Rancière et al. (2008) construct a model of an
open economy with two sectors – nontradable and tradable – and two frictions – limited enforcement
and systemic bailouts in the case of an external debt crisis. Financial liberalization (a reduction in
capital controls) allows firms in the nontradable sector to borrow more, and the bailout guarantees
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induce them to borrow in foreign currency, which leads to (rare) crises. However, average growth under
financial liberalization is higher than under repression. Therefore Rancière et al. (2008) conclude that a
volatile high-growth path may be preferable to non-volatile stagnation if frictions cannot be approached
directly. The view of efficient crises is shared by proponents of the so-called Greenspan doctrine, which
states that crises should only be counteracted after their occurrence, as any ex-ante macroprudential
regulation will necessarily be too blunt a tool and create negative distortions (Benigno et al., 2013).
The distortions on financial markets created by regulation should affect investment, hamper growth
(Ramey and Ramey, 1995) and potentially even increase real volatility (Aghion et al., 2010). This
view is not unchallenged: if crises are the result of inefficient overborrowing, then ex-ante policy could
improve welfare by reducing credit growth (Jeanne and Korinek, 2013; Mendoza and Bianchi, 2011).
In practice, it is very likely that a mixture of different policy tools – ex-ante and ex-post – is the
second-best option in the face of a multitude of frictions.
Our second variable of interest, reserve requirements, is one of the main tools of macroprudential
policy. Reserve requirements describe the percentage of their deposits banks have to hold as reserves
at the central bank. Thus, reserve requirements act as a tax on the banking system (Glocker and
Towbin, 2012). They increase intermediation costs and drive a wedge between deposit and lending
rates (Walsh, 2012). As such, they are very similar to the ex-ante tools considered in Jeanne and
Korinek (2013) or the tax on capital flows in Ma (2018).
Three broad reasons have been suggested for the use of reserve requirements (Gray, 2011). First,
mainly open developing countries have been using them as a complement to monetary policy (Vargas
et al., 2011). Capital flows to a country depend on its interest rate differential towards developed
economies. If this differential increases (for example, due to contractionary domestic monetary pol-
icy), it attracts capital inflows and vice versa. These capital flow dynamics can render countercyclical
monetary policy on its own ineffective. Countercyclical reserve requirements, especially if they are
differentiated along currencies, can reduce the effect of interest rates on capital flows. Second, re-
serve requirements directly affect credit growth. Using them countercyclically can serve the purpose
of liquidity management for the banking sector. Third and beyond addressing credit fluctuations,
reserve requirements can be implemented with macroprudential policy in mind. In this case, differing
requirements for different maturities can incentivize the creation of safer maturity portfolios. All three
reasons have in common that reserve requirements are used to reduce bubbles and systemic risk-taking
in the financial sector (Arregui et al., 2013). Thus, they aim to mitigate the severe negative short-run
effects of systemic banking crises.3
The potential short-run effects of reserve requirements, especially as a complement of monetary policy,
have been widely studied in the literature.4 In line with the considerations above, Glocker and Towbin
(2015) identify interest rate and reserve requirement shocks via zero and sign restrictions in a structural
vector autoregressive model (VAR model) employing Brazilian data. They show that a discretionary
tightening of reserve requirements leads to a decline in domestic credit, an increase in unemployment,
a depreciation of the exchange rate, an improvement of the current account, and an increase in the
price level. Overall, they conclude that reserve requirements provide a potential way to rein in credit
3Reserve requirements simultaneously address currency and banking crises (twin crises in the sense of Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999)) if capital flows management is their main objective.
4Reserve requirements only affect banks and thus have a much less ubiquitous focus than interest rate policy.
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growth without attracting net capital inflows and exchange rate appreciation. This finding is supported
by microeconomic studies, see for example Becker et al. (2017). Tovar et al. (2012) and Arregui
et al. (2013) confirm in panel VARs that macroprudential instruments including reserve requirements
reduce (temporary) credit and house price growth. Montoro and Moreno (2011) find that higher
requirements have two beneficial effects in crises times. First, higher buffers increase resilience per
se. Second, the possibility of lowering requirements helps to offset tighter financing conditions by
providing liquidity. However, all these studies share a focus on short-run developments and focus
purely on credit development.
We add to their analysis by describing the long-run growth effects of reserve requirements and crises.
In particular, we aim to test the predictions of the theoretical setting put forward by Ma (2018)
concerning the long-run growth effects of reserve requirements in crisis and noncrisis periods. These
imply that reserve requirements, as a macroprudential policy instrument, increase growth during crisis
periods, while its effect on external borrowing impacts economic growth negatively in tranquil periods.
3 Data and stylized facts
The predictions derived by the theoretical models presented in the previous section imply ambiguous
effects of macroprudential policy (and in particular, reserve requirements) on economic growth. In
this section, we present some descriptive evidence on the existing links between reserve requirements,
crises, credit growth and economic growth.
Our main objective is to find the medium-run to long-run influence of reserve requirements and crises
on real activity, measured by the growth rate of GDP per capita.5 To complement the existing
literature on the effects of regulation and crises on credit growth, we also provide results on the robust
determinants of the growth rate of three different credit measures. In particular, we concentrate on
the growth rates of bank credit to private sector, credit by financial sector and credit to private sector.
While conceptually close, there are accounting differences among the three measures. For example,
bank credit to the private sector may be much closer to credit to private sector in a bank-based financial
system than in a market-based financial system. Additionally, the size of the government sector affects
the different credit aggregates differently.
Economic crises and reserve requirements were not often employed as potential covariates in the
literature on the robust determinants of long-run economic growth. However, as documented in the
previous section, both crises and regulation may have long-run effects. In this study, we measure
crisis occurrence using dates of systemic banking crises from Laeven and Valencia (2013). To our
knowledge, this is the most comprehensive database of systemic banking crises worldwide. For reserve
requirements, we use data from the large international database of Federico et al. (2014). This database
contains unbalanced quarterly data on reserve requirements in 60 countries (and, additionally, the euro
area as an aggregate) from 1969 onwards.
Figure 1 shows the development of our two main variables of interest, systemic banking crises and
reserve requirements, over the period spanned by our sample. In the left plot, it can be observed that
5An overview of all variables and summary statistics on the full (unbalanced) dataset can be found in the Appendix,
Tables A.1 and A.2. Table A.3 provides information on the coverage over countries and time for our baseline estimations.
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Figure 1: Descriptive statistics of crises and reserve requirements
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Reserve requirement data are from the database of Federico et al. (2014).
the share of crises per year in our sample is highest during the financial and subsequent sovereign debt
crisis. The smaller number of countries in the early part of our sample, together with lower degrees of
financial liberalization, have contributed to the low frequency of crises in this period.
The right plot of Figure 1 reports our second variable of interest, reserve requirements, for the same
sample. The advantage of the database by Federico et al. (2014) is that we observe the exact value of
reserve requirements. Advanced economies tend to set extremely low requirements, sometimes even
zero. On the other end, Colombia had requirements of 100% from 1977 to 1979. Mexico and Brazil
also set requirements at 50% or above during their respective economic crises in 1988 and 1994.6
Despite this large cross-sectional variation, the development of the cross-sectional average of reserve
requirements over the years is fairly stable. If anything, there seems to be a slight downward trend of
requirements both in the median (thick black line) and the outliers (circles). This stability can mainly
be attibuted to an expansion of our geographical sample, mainly towards middle-income and low-
income countries, which usually have higher requirements than advanced economies. Within nearly
every country individually, we observe a downward trend for reserve requirements. However, at all
times there are some countries with very high reserve requirements (20% and more).
The descriptive statistics refer to mean reserve requirements. This hides potentially large differences
across different types of deposits. Reserve requirements are classified in four different categories.
First, there may only be a single (flat) requirement. Second, requirements can be differentiated across
maturities (demand, savings and term deposits). Japan, for example, requires banks to hold larger
6Other databases such as Cerutti et al. (2017) provide information on the existence or legal opportunity to introduce
reserve requirements and other macroprudential policy tools. However, given the large cross-sectional variation in Federico
et al. (2014), we should not expect to find strong effects from the pure existence of requirements.
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reserves for demand deposits than for savings and term deposits, because the former have shorter
maturities and are therefore more prone to bank-runs. Third, requirements may be differentiated
across local and foreign currencies. For example, Peru employs different requirements for deposits
in local and foreign currencies. As a reaction to large capital inflows in the boom years from 2006
to 2008, requirements on foreign deposits were increased from 20% to 49%, while those on local
deposits just went from 6% to 9%. A fourth classification differentiates both across maturities and
currencies. In most of our analysis we use the simple average of these requirements, mean(rr).7 In
additional estimations, we also employ the squared average and two different measures for the degree
of differentiation across requirements, namely, the difference between the maximum and minimum
requirement, maxdiff(rr), and the standard deviation of requirements, sd(rr), see Table A.2 in the
Appendix.
Beyond this simple differentiation covered in our data, there are numerous idiosyncratic rules. They
are set by the central bank, which can adjust a number of parameters. Possible options are, among
others (a) at which rate reserves are remunerated (if at all); (b) to allow reserve averaging (i.e., set a
longer period over which reserves must only be met on average); (c) to differentiate requirements over
certain types of deposits, or to exclude certain deposits altogether;8 and (d) to apply requirements to
all existing deposits or only to newly created ones (Gray, 2011).
In Figure 2, we plot yearly GDP and credit growth rates from ten years before to ten years after a
systemic banking crisis.9 Growth rates of GDP and credit are both substantially lower in the year of a
crisis than in other years. However, GDP growth rates are still positive in nearly 50% of the countries
(Devereux and Dwyer, 2016). In line with the discussion in the previous section, neither credit nor
GDP growth rates seem to be much higher after a crisis than before (Cerra and Saxena, 2008; Laeven
and Valencia, 2013). Beyond average effects, the large uncertainty of all four growth rates allows for
both negative or positive medium- to long-run growth effects.
In the previous section, we have documented the use of reserve requirements as a countercyclical policy
tool. Figure 3 provides some limited evidence of such a usage around systemic financial crises.10 In
the year of the crisis, requirements drop on average by 2.5% and continue to stay lower than in the
year prior to the crisis thereafter.11
The stylized facts presented above show patterns in our variables of interest in an unconditional man-
ner. Disentangling the actual effect of reserve requirements on credit and GDP growth requires con-
trolling for a series of other potential determinants of these two variables. Our additional control vari-
7As the data are internationally not available, we cannot calculate effective requirements, where the different require-
ments are weighted by the share of affected deposits (Glocker and Towbin, 2015).
8Differentiation can go as far as exempting specific banks. In the case of Brazil, for instance, reserve requirements act
as a de facto subsidy from large banks to small banks (Robitaille et al., 2011).
9Figure 2 should give a flavor of correlations between crises and growth rates. However, it is likely that it paints an
incomplete picture for at least two reasons. First, we do not control for additional variables. Second, it could well be
that developments before and after a crisis are both extraordinary. By focusing only on a short window around a crisis,
we cannot give an impression of growth rates in “normal” times.
10Figure 3 is intended to motivate our hypothesis. However, as an event study with a focus on a limited window
around crises and without controlling for additional variables, it cannot give the full picture.
11Some advanced economies such as the Eurozone use a low level of requirements to stabilize money market rates and
link them to central bank interest rates rather than as countercyclical tools. However, whenever this is the main goal of
requirements, they are typically very close to zero. Fluctuations (if they exist) are due to serious shortages on interbank
markets, which are internationally linked across advanced economies. We control for this in our empirical setting by
using country- and time-fixed effects.
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Figure 2: Development of GDP and credit growth around crises
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Figure 3: Development of reserve requirements after crises
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Note: The analysis is based on 54 crises, drawn from Laeven and Valencia (2013) and reserve requirements from Federico
et al. (2014). We report mean, median as well as the 16 and 84-percentile of the data.
ables are mostly standard covariates employed in the growth literature (see for example Moral-Benito,
2012). These variables focus mostly on determinants of long-run growth and include covariates based
on theoretical frameworks that are often used in the empirical literature to study economic growth
differences across economies. We include variables that correspond to the human capital-augmented
Solow model (gross capital formation, population growth, initial income per capita and educational
attainment variables), as well as covariates measuring age structure, which have been highlighted as
economic growth predictors by Lindh and Malmberg (1999) or Bloom et al. (2007), variables related
to international trade and foreign direct investment (see, for example, Frankel and Romer, 1999) and
to credit access (King and Levine, 1993). Importantly, we include capital account openness and other
variables of financial liberalization to ensure that our results are driven by macroprudential motives
for reserve requirements (Rancière et al., 2008). The set of potential models encompassed by combina-
tions of covariates of the pool used in our analysis corresponds therefore to many of the specifications
that are routinely used to address long-run economic growth in modern empirical studies. However,
our variables of interest most likely have the strongest effect on growth at business cycle frequencies.
To avoid attributing wrong effects to crises and reserve requirements, we need to control for additional
macroeconomic variables operating at the same frequency. Therefore, we also include real interest
rates, inflation measures and unemployment, as well as the current account and external debt to our
list of potential regressors. This captures the most important macroeconomic and financial leading
indicators. Our dataset also contains information on exchange rate regimes, which is used in a ro-
bustness check aimed at assessing subsample heterogeneity in the effect of reserve requirements on
economic growth (see section 5). To control for unobserved country specificity and global shocks, we
add country- and period-fixed effects in all our specifications.
As usual in the literature on long-run economic growth, we abstract away from effects within business
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cycle frequencies by forming nonoverlapping five-year averages for all variables in our main specifica-
tion. All right-hand side variables are lagged one period (i.e., averages of the prior five-year block).
This leaves us with 314 observations in our baseline model covering 5-year periods in 66 countries
between 1985 and 2015, see Table A.3 in the Appendix. In a robustness check without reserve re-
quirements and crises, we are able to extend our dataset to 485 observations, covering 97 countries. If
we deviate from our baseline estimation by replacing GDP growth with credit growth or by including
exchange rate arrangements as an additional explanatory variable, the number of observations varies
only slightly.
We also present results from separate Bayesian model-averaging exercises where data are averaged over
non-overlapping blocks of different lengths. Specifically, we let the block length vary from three to ten
years, the typical length of business cycles. As with the estimates with block length of five years, we
lag all explanatory variables by one block. Coefficient estimates on very short blocks (one-two years)
would be strongly affected by business cycle effects and are potentially not immune to expectation
effects and thus reverse causality. At the other end, estimates on long blocks are conditional on very
small sample sizes, a problem that is further aggravated by the fact that we control for country- and
time-fixed effects.
4 Methodological framework: Reserve requirements and economic
growth under model uncertainty
To assess quantitatively the role played by reserve requirements as a determinant of both credit and
income per capita growth in the presence of specification uncertainty, we consider the following class
of linear panel data models applied to N observations,
gi,t = αi +
k∑
j=1
βjxi,j,t−1 + λt + εi,t, (1)
where gi,t is the dependent variable of interest (alternatively the growth rate of credit or income per
capita in country i and five-year period t). A model is defined by the choice of k variables as explanatory
covariates. These variables are assumed to belong to a pool of K potential covariates that may explain
within-country differences in the dependent variable of interest. All models include country-fixed effects
(αi) and time-fixed effects (λt) to control for observable and unobservable differences across economies
that remain constant over time, as well as for shocks to gi,t that are common across countries. In
addition, we assume that εi,t is a homoskedastic, normally distributed shock with variance σ2.
Our main interest is to quantify the effect of the variable measuring reserve requirements, which is in
the pool of available covariates. Since the effect of reserve requirements on both credit growth and
income per capita growth is potentially affected by whether the economy is experiencing a crisis, we
add the interaction between the reserve requirements covariate and a crisis dummy as an additional
variable in the set of potential determinants of gi,t. The full set of covariates used to construct panel
data models of the type given by equation (1) corresponds to that presented in Table A.2, augmented
with the interaction term mentioned above.
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We integrate model uncertainty by carrying out inference on the effect of the explanatory variables
based on the full set of models that can be created using the pool of potential covariates. In such a
setting, the posterior distribution for the parameter corresponding to variable xj , βj , is given by
P (βj |y) =
2K∑
l=1
P (βl|Ml, y)P (Ml|y), (2)
where posterior distributions are denoted by P (·|y), and where P (·|Ml, y) stands for the posterior
distribution conditional on the specification given by model Ml and data y. Inference is performed
based on the posterior distributions obtained from individual specifications, weighted by posterior
model probabilities, P (Ml|y). These are proportional to the product of the marginal likelihood of the
corresponding model (P (y|Ml)) and the prior model probability (P (Ml)). The integrated likelihood
of a model can be computed as
P (y|Ml) =
∫
βl
∫
σ
f(y|βl, σ)P (βl, σ)dβldσ, (3)
where f(y|βl, σ) is the likelihood function under model Ml and P (βl, σ) is the prior density over
the parameters of Mk. It is standard in the literature on Bayesian model averaging (BMA, see for
example Fernández et al., 2001b,a; Ley and Steel, 2007, 2012) to assume a flat prior over log(σ), so
that P (σ) ∝ σ−1, and an independent g-prior over βl, which implies that
βl|σ,Ml ∼ N(0, gσ2(X ′lXl)−1), (4)
where the columns of matrix Xl contain the observations of the explanatory variables included in Ml.
The g-prior given by equation (4) assumes the same covariance structure as for the OLS estimator of
βl, scaled by g. Recent contributions propose the use of a hierarchical prior structure where a prior
distribution over g is imposed. Liang et al. (2008), Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009) or Cui and George
(2008), for instance, put forward alternative Beta priors over the shrinkage factor (given by g/(1+ g))
which increase robustness of inference in the presence of model uncertainty further (see also Ley and
Steel, 2012, for a comparison of hyper-g-priors in simulated settings). This is the setting employed in
the empirical application of this study, which results in relatively flat priors centered around zero for
the parameters of all covariates in the pool of potential determinants.12
With respect to the prior over models, P (Ml), the BMA literature has moved from assigning a uniform
prior over the model space (see for example Fernández et al., 2001b) or fixed prior inclusion proba-
bilities by covariate (see for example Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004) to hierarchical priors, where a (Beta)
prior is imposed on the inclusion probability of each variable. Such a Beta-Binomial prior on model
specifications has the advantage of providing more robust inference than priors based on fixing the
inclusion probability of explanatory variables. Additionally, it makes the prior on model size less de-
12 Early contributions to the application of BMA to econometric specifications (Fernández et al., 2001b; Sala-i-Martin
et al., 2004) tend to use fixed values of g corresponding to settings that result in integrated likelihoods incorporating well
understood penalties on the inclusion of new variables in the model. The uniform information prior (UIP) results in an
integrated likelihood that can be approximated using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC, see Schwarz, 1978) and
corresponds to setting g = N . Alternatively, setting g = K2, for instance, leads to the so-called risk inflation criterion
(RIC, Foster and George, 1994). Fernández et al. (2001a), making use of a comparison based on simulated settings,
propose the so-called BRIC criterion, which corresponds to g = max(N,K2).
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pendent on the choice of the g-prior (Ley and Steel, 2009). Since our particular application includes an
interaction term among the potential covariates, treating all specifications in the model space equally
a priori may lead to inference, which is difficult to interpret. This is because specifications with an
interaction term but without the parent variables would be entertained in the averaging exercise. To
avoid basing our inference on such potentially misleading models, we apply a strong heredity prior
on covariate inclusion (Chipman, 1996; Crespo Cuaresma, 2011). Under this prior, specifications that
include an interactive variable without also including the linear terms corresponding to both of the in-
teracted variables are assigned a zero prior probability, thus ensuring that inference on the interaction
term is properly interpretable.
Given the large number of models that need to be estimated to compute posterior distributions (in
our benchmark estimation we have K = 36, so the model space contains approximately 69 billion
specifications), we employ a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to analyze the space of
specifications (Kass and Wasserman, 1995). Our inference is based on 1’000’000 MCMC draws (visiting
approximately 550’000 different models), after discarding 100’000 steps as a burn-in sample. The usual
statistics used to ensure convergence of the Markov chain indicate systematically that statistics based
on the visited models can be safely used to perform inference.13
5 Empirical results: The effect of reserve requirements on economic
growth
5.1 Reserve requirements and credit growth
The previous literature has documented in a number of studies that tightening reserve requirements
tends to be followed by lower credit growth. However, most of these studies focus on short-term to
medium-run effects. Camors and Peydro (2014), for example, exploit a single change in regulation in
Uruguay to identify reactions by banks. Glocker and Towbin (2015) and Tovar et al. (2012) employ
VAR methods with monthly data and are therefore in principle able to identify longer-run effects
of reserve requirement shocks. However, they restrict their impulse-response functions to four-year
and one-year horizons. Our analysis has a natural focus on longer horizons, and therefore provides a
reference to compare the conclusions of these studies and assess whether short-run reactions persist
at longer horizons. Moreover, our Bayesian approach to addressing inference allows us to integrate
away the uncertainty attached to the choice of controls in the specification, thus providing robust
alternative empirical evidence compared to the findings from (admittedly rather large-scale) VARs.
The comparative disadvantage of our analysis, on the other hand, is that we are not able to provide
results on adjustment dynamics beyond conditional convergence speeds, nor can we strictly identify
exogenous shocks. To rule out reverse causality, we assume that reserve requirements and other control
variables do not react to medium-run expectations (covering the following five years) of credit and
GDP growth. The lag structure imposed in our model space, where explanatory variables are lagged
by five years, provides a chronology that makes endogeneity concerns arguably unimportant in our
setting.
13The correlation between the analytical and MCMC-based posterior model probabilities is above 0.99 in the baseline
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Table 1: Bayesian model averaging results for credit growth
bank credit to private sector credit by financial sector credit to private sector
variable pip mean t-stat pip mean t-stat pip mean t-stat
mean(rr) 0.472 4.572 1.048 0.766 9.408 1.379 0.450 4.061 1.053
crisis 0.427 0.344 0.401 0.758 1.967 1.270 0.551 -0.545 -0.479
mean(rr)#crisis 0.241 -5.887 -1.534 0.704 -33.076 -2.899 0.304 -9.133 -1.984
bank credit to private sector 1.000 -0.206 -4.272 0.422 -0.018 -0.998 0.434 -0.030 -1.459
credit by financial sector 0.837 0.078 2.352 0.988 -0.126 -3.882 0.690 0.063 2.286
credit to private sector 0.402 -0.024 -0.917 0.353 0.004 0.177 0.970 -0.182 -3.041
EU dummy 0.954 -7.037 -2.975 0.697 -3.010 -1.747 0.931 -6.018 -2.803
labor force part. 0.844 -0.202 -2.494 0.546 -0.078 -1.528 0.700 -0.139 -2.198
pop. above 65 0.840 -1.423 -2.730 0.351 0.114 0.572 0.617 -0.775 -2.161
pop. growth 0.798 2.434 2.341 0.871 2.704 2.518 0.933 3.362 3.024
log gdp/capita 0.772 4.731 2.251 0.960 7.964 3.187 0.702 3.979 2.207
low-income country dummy 0.723 6.388 1.961 0.625 5.114 1.647 0.529 3.694 1.714
pop. under 14 0.600 -0.345 -1.868 0.344 -0.021 -0.205 0.367 -0.135 -1.222
capital account openness 0.562 2.070 1.669 0.413 0.876 0.971 0.344 0.773 1.061
upper-middle income dummy 0.534 -1.336 -1.061 0.432 0.008 0.007 0.373 -0.606 -0.749
tertiary education 0.472 0.152 1.344 0.391 -0.077 -0.817 0.249 0.007 0.127
lower-middle income dummy 0.467 0.781 0.452 0.546 2.115 1.181 0.337 0.470 0.443
urban pop. 0.414 -0.084 -1.126 0.337 0.008 0.143 0.256 -0.018 -0.410
inflation, cpi 0.407 0.022 0.990 0.536 0.015 0.755 0.428 0.033 1.298
inflation, gdp deflator 0.373 -0.013 -0.795 0.538 0.013 0.841 0.395 -0.020 -1.122
current account 0.360 0.030 0.491 0.456 0.086 1.068 0.318 0.029 0.562
fdi outflows 0.348 0.054 0.733 0.351 0.025 0.348 0.253 0.005 0.111
imports/GDP 0.348 -0.009 -0.023 0.370 -0.102 -0.169 0.288 0.024 0.068
life expectancy 0.346 0.071 0.750 0.327 -0.003 -0.038 0.288 0.057 0.761
secondary education 0.335 0.012 0.441 0.339 0.006 0.229 0.265 0.000 -0.018
household consumption 0.329 -0.045 -0.114 0.433 0.161 0.243 0.278 -0.065 -0.184
exports/GDP 0.319 -0.026 -0.066 0.373 0.078 0.129 0.272 -0.050 -0.146
govt. consumption 0.316 0.026 0.066 0.716 0.533 0.620 0.301 0.023 0.062
investment/gdp 0.315 -0.041 -0.105 0.519 0.009 0.012 0.315 -0.084 -0.224
govt. debt 0.313 -0.004 -0.397 0.534 -0.022 -1.504 0.270 -0.004 -0.566
trade openness 0.312 0.008 0.456 0.341 0.008 0.424 0.310 0.015 0.921
reserves (months of imports) 0.310 -0.029 -0.393 0.341 -0.030 -0.373 0.270 -0.028 -0.444
pop. density 0.310 0.000 -0.145 0.337 0.000 0.270 0.267 0.000 0.552
fdi inflows 0.308 -0.012 -0.160 0.340 0.016 0.218 0.254 0.014 0.275
primary education 0.306 -0.005 -0.181 0.434 -0.037 -0.993 0.379 -0.036 -1.186
total pop. 0.301 0.000 0.262 0.359 0.000 0.478 0.266 0.000 0.383
political rights 0.292 -0.005 -0.101 0.348 -0.031 -0.498 0.241 0.006 0.143
Fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 305 305 305
Note: Columns report the posterior inclusion probability (pip), unconditional mean (mean) and t-statistic conditional
on inclusion (t-stat) of the coefficients. The corresponding BMA results without average reserve requirements and crisis
dummies can be found in the appendix in Table A.4.
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Table 1 reports results from our BMA exercise with three different measures of credit growth as
a dependent variable. Specifically, we consider growth rates of (i) domestic credit provided by the
financial sector, (ii) total credit to the private sector, and (iii) credit to the private sector provided
by the banking sector. All credit measures are expressed as shares of GDP. For every credit growth
measure, we report results for BMA applied to the model space spanned by combinations of control
variables in Table A.2 including mean(rr), the crisis dummy and the interaction of the two. In all cases,
we report the posterior inclusion probability, the unconditional mean and the ratio of posterior mean
to posterior standard deviation (thus resembling the frequentist t-statistic) conditional on inclusion for
all variables entertained in the exercise. The posterior inclusion probability of a variable is given by the
sum of posterior model probabilities of the specifications that include that variable as a covariate and
is routinely interpreted as the importance of the variable when explaining variability in our dependent
variable. As a different representation, Figure 4 depicts the conditional posterior distribution of our
three main variables of interest in the regression on the growth rate of credit by the financial sector.
The reported conditional mean effect (denoted by Cond. EV in the figure) can be interpreted as the
effect of this variable if it was always included. The effect is determined by the unconditional mean
in the Table 1 divided by the corresponding inclusion probability.
Several results among those presented in Table 1 stand out. First, we find fairly high posterior inclusion
probabilities for mean(rr), crisis and their interaction, in particular for credit by the financial sector,
indicating that the data tend to support the robustness of these variables as determinants of credit
growth. Second, we find that past crises and past levels of reserve requirements have a positive effect
on credit growth. Since crises rarely extend over more than one period and are contemporaneously
associated with a sharp slowdown of credit growth (see Figure 2), the positive coefficient on lagged
crises implies a credit expansion back to normal levels. We also find a positive coefficient on mean
reserve requirements. Studies based on VAR models (Tovar et al., 2012; Arregui et al., 2013; Glocker
and Towbin, 2015) suggest a short-run negative effect of increasing requirements on credit growth.
However, as requirements are highly persistent, increases have an effect in the medium to long run
(our measure of analysis), which seems to be positive for credit growth according to our findings.
Taken together, faster credit growth after a short-run credit tightening may be a sign that either
reserve requirements do not create permanent impairments to credit levels, or that there is an initial
overreaction of financial markets in a reduction of credit.
Third, high reserve requirements during systemic banking crises have a strongly negative effect on
credit growth even in the long run. This is consistent with the idea that reserve requirements should
be lowered during a crisis to remove constraints from the stressed banking sector and enable its quick
stabilization. Indeed, our data suggest that requirements are lowered in the first year of a crisis (see
Figure 3). Once model uncertainty is taken into account, the standard deviation of our coefficient
estimates is quite large (see Figure 4 for the estimation on growth of credit by the financial sector).
Only the mean of the posterior distribution of the interaction coefficient is more than two standard
deviations away from zero, further strengthening the recommendation of reducing requirements during
a crisis.
Given the relatively large number of (potentially correlated) covariates, the lack of “significance” of
model on GDP growth. Further convergence checks can be obtained from the authors.
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Figure 4: Credit by financial sector, posterior marginal densities of selected coefficients
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Note: Densities are conditional on inclusion of the variable in the model. The full posterior density would be given by a
scaled version of the reported densities, combined with a point-mass at zero.
Figure 5: Credit by financial sector, selected coefficients from models with different block lengths
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Note: We report median coefficients together with 90% confidence sets conditional on inclusion from separate estimations
with varying block length between three and ten years.
coefficients (in a frequentist sense) does not appear surprising. Following Raftery (1995), applications
of Bayesian model averaging have also used other thresholds different from the standard frequentist
ones. Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008), for instance, proposes the use of posterior mean-to-standard
deviation ratio thresholds of 1 or 1.3 to identify well estimated effects.14
Our results are confirmed for more than just the five-year blocks used in the main analysis. In Figure
5, we show the results from separate Bayesian model average exercises for growth of credit by the
financial sector with different block lengths, as described above. We report median coefficients and
90% confidence sets conditional on inclusion in the posterior model. The figure confirms that reserve
requirements have a positive or insignificant effect on credit growth at medium to long horizons. The
14Raftery (1995) studies the link between the relative improvement in posterior model probability and the t-statistics
aimed at testing significance. For the standard settings applied in Bayesian model averaging a ratio of posterior mean to
posterior standard deviation above unity (a t-stat of 1) appears equivalent to an improvement in the fit of the regression
after accounting for the inclusion of a new variable.
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effect of crises shows a very familiar s-shape, whereby a credit crunch shortly after a crisis is followed
by a strong rebound at longer horizons.15 Lastly, the interaction effect is negative (albeit often at low
inclusion probabilities) for block lengths of four years and longer.
In addition to our results for reserve requirements and crises, we also find evidence of conditional
convergence dynamics in all credit measures, which materializes in robust negative partial correlations
between the initial level of credit and subsequent credit growth.16 Systematic robust effects with
relatively precise estimates for the effect of all credit measures are also found for the following control
variables: An economy with faster population growth also tends to exhibit faster credit growth, while
older populations tend to reduce their reliance on credit. Moreover, richer economies (as measured
by GDP/capita) show faster credit growth. Furthermore, EU economies tend to present lower growth
rates of credit independently of the measure used, while the opposite is true for low income countries
(as defined by the World Bank classification). Finally, a higher labor force participation is associated
with lower credit growth, a result that is likely to be caused by the fact that the highest increases in
labor force participation (due mostly to the incorporation of women into the labor force, as well as
improvements in educational attainment levels) tend to occur in the low and middle-income countries
of our sample.
5.2 Reserve requirements and income growth
We now turn to the main analysis, where we investigate the effects of reserve requirements and systemic
banking crises on economic growth. In a first step, we perform a similar analysis as above with the
growth rate of GDP per capita as a dependent variable. The results of the BMA applied to this setting
are reported in Table 2. Here, we also report estimation results, where we exclude our variables of
interest and stick to the usual control variables. This increases the sample size and thus provides
better estimated effects. We can see that differences between the two estimations are mostly small.
As expected, initial GDP per capita levels have a strong negative effect on growth after controlling
for other covariates, indicating conditional convergence to country-specific long-run balanced growth
paths. Moreover, variables describing economic openness and international competitiveness appear
as important robust determinants of economic growth. Concerning demographics, population growth
has the expected negative effect on income growth, while the size of the population affects growth
positively.
We report the distribution of our three main coefficients of interest, the ones on mean(rr), crisis and
their interaction, in Figure 6. Average reserve requirements have (on average) a negative long-run
effect on growth, as would be expected from stronger regulation.17 Increasing requirements by 10
15This result may partly be driven by the somewhat different cyclical behavior of credit compared to GDP as docu-
mented in the literature on financial cycles Drehmann et al. (2012). In particular, the larger individual coefficients of
reserve requirements for shorter block length may still capture cyclical effects.
16We also conduct a similar estimation without the variables of interest, reported in Table A.4 of the Appendix.
Due to missing observations, the dataset including our variables of interest is markedly smaller. Twenty-eight (mostly
developing) economies were removed from the dataset due to lack of information in the covariates of interest. While
coefficients remain broadly robust, posterior inclusion probabilities are generally much more extreme and mostly closer to
zero in the model estimates based on datasets without reserve requirements and crises. That is, the posterior model size
distribution favors much smaller models (four to six regressors) among the latter models compared to the specifications
reported in Table 1 (15 to 18 regressors).
17These effects remain nearly identical if we drop capital account openness from the set of explanatory variables.
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Table 2: Bayesian model averaging results with and without reserve requirements and crisis
GDP growth GDP growth, with RR and crisis
variable pip mean t-stat pip mean t-stat
mean(rr) 0.553 -1.290 -1.188
crisis 0.628 0.303 1.186
mean(rr)#crisis 0.221 0.621 0.779
log gdp/capita 1.000 -3.735 -6.672 0.986 -2.061 -2.930
pop. growth 0.983 -0.785 -3.109 0.605 -0.289 -1.555
total pop. 0.954 0.000 3.183 0.890 0.000 2.404
fdi outflows 0.849 -0.115 -2.300 0.998 -0.272 -3.988
urban pop. 0.583 0.034 2.122 0.543 0.027 1.280
credit to private sector 0.568 -0.011 -1.571 0.629 -0.012 -1.440
fdi inflows 0.530 0.049 1.889 0.997 0.251 3.629
life expectancy 0.504 0.044 1.898 0.332 0.003 0.126
investment/gdp 0.455 -0.018 -0.317 0.424 -0.003 -0.028
current account 0.434 0.021 1.626 0.947 0.102 2.710
credit by financial sector 0.372 0.004 1.285 0.546 0.008 1.239
reserves (months of imports) 0.343 -0.020 -1.481 0.813 -0.105 -2.328
lower-middle income dummy 0.341 0.287 1.173 0.453 0.307 0.890
trade openness 0.333 0.004 1.325 0.417 -0.004 -0.883
inflation, gdp deflator 0.313 0.001 0.776 0.331 0.000 -0.060
inflation, cpi 0.302 0.001 0.514 0.335 -0.001 -0.232
upper-middle income dummy 0.297 0.218 1.169 0.524 0.387 1.266
exports/GDP 0.247 0.008 0.199 0.378 0.013 0.126
bank credit to private sector 0.239 0.000 0.120 0.377 -0.001 -0.307
low-income country dummy 0.233 0.038 0.134 0.434 -0.284 -0.575
pop. above 65 0.219 -0.021 -0.849 0.501 -0.093 -1.320
imports/GDP 0.210 -0.007 -0.178 0.366 -0.016 -0.151
pop. under 14 0.207 -0.008 -0.676 0.366 -0.012 -0.506
secondary education 0.202 0.002 0.745 0.333 -0.001 -0.093
household consumption 0.195 0.007 0.184 0.396 0.021 0.192
govt. debt 0.189 0.000 0.070 0.770 0.010 2.017
labor force part. 0.186 -0.002 -0.617 0.330 -0.002 -0.268
political rights 0.185 0.004 0.613 0.607 -0.041 -1.635
pop. density 0.185 0.000 0.496 0.334 0.000 0.187
govt. consumption 0.179 0.003 0.072 0.339 0.007 0.066
capital account openness 0.177 0.042 0.521 0.567 0.460 1.603
primary education 0.171 0.000 -0.021 0.363 0.004 0.546
tertiary education 0.170 0.002 0.227 0.457 -0.029 -1.170
EU dummy 0.170 -0.013 -0.147 0.336 0.040 0.211
Fixed effects YES YES
Observations 475 306
Note: Columns report the posterior inclusion probability (pip), unconditional mean (mean) and t-statistic conditional
on inclusion (t-stat) of the coefficients.
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Figure 6: GDP growth, posterior marginal densities of selected coefficients
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Note: Densities are conditional on inclusion of the variable in the model. The full posterior density would be given by a
scaled version of the reported densities, combined with a point-mass at zero.
percentage points reduces economic growth by approximately 0.13 percentage points. However, higher
levels of reserve requirements tend to be associated with a lower fall in economic growth during crises.
A possible reason for such a result is that crises are less severe if regulation is stronger and that reserve
requirements are employed countercyclically and loosened to free liquidity during a crisis, see Figure 3.
It should be noted, however, that the low inclusion probability of the interaction term of mean(rr) and
crisis implies little evidence for the robustness of such asymmetric effects of reserve requirements in
this particular setting. Moreover, while reserve requirements may smooth volatility of GDP through a
crisis, the overall effect appears negative for the data at hand. As in the results for credit growth, we
find that past crises have a positive effect on income growth. Recessions and recoveries after crises take
longer than usual business cycles, and cyclical amplitudes are higher (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 2014;
Bordo and Haubrich, 2017), which can explain why crises have a positive effect on long-run growth
on average in our results. A second reason may be related to the fact that crises provide a trigger
to improve institutions (for example through IMF programs), having an additional and permanent
positive effect on economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005). However, it should be noted that all
coefficients are small and very imprecisely estimated.
Figure 7 gives further confirmation to our findings and shows the median coefficients together with
90% confidence sets conditional on inclusion for estimations with different block lengths.18 With
longer horizons, the negative effect of reserve requirements becomes more pronounced. A similar
strengthening of our findings can be observed for the interaction term, with zero not being part of
the confidence set for most longer blocks. Crises, however, have no significant and systematic effect
on GDP growth. That is, we cannot reject the possibility that there is no catching up after a crisis
(Cerra and Saxena, 2008).
How can we align the results for GDP growth and credit growth with each other? Crises tend to be
followed by increased growth five years in the future in both cases. This finding seems sensible as
the correlation between credit and GDP growth is particularly high around financial crises. However,
18Inclusion probabilities are on average 70% for reserve requirements, 75% for crises and approximately 50% for the
interaction term, with probabilities increasing for longer blocks.
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Figure 7: GDP growth, selected coefficients from models with different block lengths
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Note: We report median coefficients together with 90% confidence sets conditional on inclusion from separate estimations
with varying block length between three and ten years.
the coefficients on average reserve requirements and its interaction with crises must be reconciled.
There are at least four possible arguments that link the results. First, credit is measured as shares of
GDP. That is, if credit growth picks up after increasing reserve requirements, this indicates that credit
increases relative to GDP. Second, the correlation of credit and GDP growth may not be extremely
high in normal times, as indicated by the finding that credit cycles may take three to four times as long
as business cycles (Drehmann et al., 2012). That is, the pure effect of average reserve requirements
on growth does not necessarily need to point in the same direction. Third and with respect to the
interaction effect, there may be a timing issue after a crisis. A financial crisis may trigger a credit
crunch, which lowers investment and thus leads to a strong drop in real GDP growth. To achieve long-
run growth in GDP, capital deepening must take place, which may take some time and some advance
credit (Kydland and Prescott, 1982). That is, we could expect credit growth to pick up earlier than
GDP growth after a crisis. The development of the interaction term over time, as shown in Figures 5
and 7, points to this possibility: coefficient estimates increase as the block length increases. Fourth,
we control for credit variables in the regression on GDP growth. That is, the negative effect of reserve
requirements on GDP growth is on top of the effect predicted purely by credit volumes, which all turn
out to be more important for GDP growth once reserve requirements and crises are included as control
variables. The fact that we find negative growth effects of reserve requirements on economic growth
in tranquil times is thus not only related to the credit channel, but also due to other effects that are
not explicitly controlled for in the specification.19 Negative growth effects from financial repression
due to the distortionary nature of changes in reserve requirements have been often predicted in the
theoretical literature (see, for instance Roubini and Sala-i Martin, 1995; Basu, 2001) depending on the
complementarity (or lack thereof) of private and publicly provided inputs. Effects of changes in reserve
requirements on macroeconomic variables that go beyond changes in investment are also reported by
19If we include an interaction effect mean(rr) with any of the three credit volume measures, we find that the individual
effect of mean(rr) on GDP growth and its interaction with credit volumes are negative. This indicates that higher reserve
requirements indeed weigh negatively on growth not only via a credit channel. A regression that includes interactions of
mean(rr) with all three credit volumes simultaneously is hard to interpret due to high degrees of multicollinearity in the
credit volume measures.
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Glocker and Towbin (2015), who find reactions of exchange rates and inflation. This, together with a
widening of interest rate spreads (Romer, 1985) may lead to net negative effects on economic activity.
Table 3: Nonlinear effects of reserve requirements
Baseline SD(RR) Difference(RR) RR squared
variable pip mean t-stat pip mean t-stat pip mean t-stat pip mean t-stat
mean(rr) 0.543 -1.266 -1.189 0.478 -1.092 -1.144 0.473 -1.080 -1.146 0.618 1.846 0.549
crisis 0.613 0.297 1.194 0.596 0.286 1.184 0.575 0.277 1.193 0.763 0.467 1.257
mean(rr)#crisis 0.209 0.583 0.773 0.160 0.404 0.570 0.151 0.385 0.582 0.397 -5.675 -1.226
sd(rr) 0.370 -0.624 -0.386
sd(rr)#crisis 0.138 0.526 0.484
maxdiff(rr) 0.359 -0.245 -0.366
maxdiff(rr)#crisis 0.129 0.214 0.463
mean(rr)2 0.740 -9.342 -1.282
mean(rr)2#crisis 0.494 23.526 1.431
Controls YES YES YES YES
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 306 306 306 306
Note: Columns report the posterior inclusion probability (pip), unconditional mean (mean) and t-statistic conditional
on inclusion (t-stat) of the coefficients.
The database of Federico et al. (2014) not only reports average reserve requirements but also differ-
entiates requirements across maturities and/or currencies of regulated deposits. Thus, it allows for
us to construct and investigate additional measures of reserve requirements that may shed light on
the degree of differentiation embodied in different policy strategies with respect to reserves. During
crises, more differentiation should allow policymakers a more targeted response to the crisis, having
a positive effect on economic growth. During normal times, increased differentiation could either
be positive (due to the same targeting argument), or regulatory complexity could weigh negatively
on growth. We look at the standard deviation of requirements across categories, and the difference
between maximum and minimum requirements to check these hypotheses.20 We use these variables
individually and – as for mean(rr) – interact them with the crisis dummy. The findings on control
variables are nearly unaffected, thus we report only variables of interest in Table 3. The differentiation
measures have only a minor effect on the results obtained for the parameters of our baseline variables
of interest. In addition, we find that inclusion probabilities are very similar to those of mean(rr) and
its interaction with the crisis dummy. Regarding the effects of differentiation (sd(rr), maxdiff(rr) and
their interactions with the crisis variable), we can confirm the hypothesis of downsides during normal
times and upsides during crisis times. However, posterior inclusion probabilities and t-stats are low,
and the positive interaction effect is never strong enough to fully counter the negative effect during
normal times.
The fourth set of columns in Table 3 presents the model averaging results for models where the
quadratic term of the reserve requirements covariate and its interaction with the crisis dummy are
included as part of the pool of explanatory variables, capturing a potential nonlinear effect of average
reserve requirements on economic growth. A quadratic relation could imply an “optimal level” of
requirements, balancing growth against volatility. Indeed, we find that the posterior inclusion proba-
20These are, admittedly, blunt measures for the degree of regulatory differentiability, as they measure the de facto
differentiation, rather than regulatory options.
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Figure 8: Joint effect of crisis and reserve requirements: quadratic specifications
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Note: The surface plot reports the quadratic function implied by the coefficients on crisis, mean(rr), mean(rr)2 and
their interactions. Black dots report actual observations.
bilities of these two variables are high, indicating a more complex nature of the link between economic
growth and reserve requirements than that implied by linear models, and its modulation by crisis
occurrence. The relationship unveiled by the data, however, does not support a simple hump-shaped
link and reveals more complicated conditional correlations between these variables. The estimated
partial relationship between crisis and reserve requirements (jointly) and economic growth is pre-
sented in Figure 8. It reports the joint effect of individual and interaction terms and displays the
actual observations on which our estimates are based. The dominating feature is a strong positive
effect on growth for larger values of the crisis variable, consistent with the large positive coefficient in
our estimations.21 On a more subtle note, we can see some differences when we vary the amount of
reserve requirements. For low levels of the crisis occurrence variable (that is, for tranquil periods), the
function is strongly hump-shaped. Moreover, the majority of observations have lower reserve require-
ments than the function maximum. That is, higher reserve requirements could have had a positive
effect on growth. This finding is reassuring for the use of reserve requirements, which should provide
a safeguard against crises and large economic fluctuations without affecting growth too negatively.
Apparently, this strategy works for medium levels of reserve requirements. For larger values of the
crisis variable, we do not find the same hump-shaped relationship. Instead, the relationship flattens,
indicating that reserve requirement levels do not affect the growth path after a long and severe finan-
cial crisis. However, we must be careful about overinterpreting the results at high crisis values, as we
have very few observations at such levels of the variable.
21Note that we calculate all variables as averages over five-year blocks. Thus, the crisis variable (which is binary on a
yearly level) can take on the values {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} in the estimation.
22
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Last, we account for the fact that many developing economies employed reserve requirements for
monetary policy or as capital controls, rather than as macroprudential policy. As argued by Walsh
(2012) in his discussion of the contribution by Glocker and Towbin (2012), reserve requirements may
weigh more negatively on growth under fixed exchange rates. Higher reserve requirements increase
the gap between lending and deposit rates necessary to maintain bank profitability. Thus, they should
lead to higher capital outflows and currency devaluation. Under a fixed exchange rate regime (where
devaluation is not an option), the central bank needs to increase its interest rate or continuously sell
reserves in order to counteract the capital outflows. This interest rate tightening, in turn, has an
additional negative effect on growth. We test whether we can confirm this hypothesis even in a setup
with a focus on longer horizons and allowing for crises. To do so, we make use of the exchange rate
arrangement classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2017). We construct two measures in addition to their
coarse and fine classification schemes (where increasing index values are associated with lower degrees
of exchange rate control). First, we remove all periods in which Ilzetzki et al. (2017) classify the
currency as either free-falling or as a “dual market in which parallel market data are missing” (their
two last categories). Second, we construct a simple dummy that is one if the fine index is equal or
above the median (eight). In addition to exchange rate arrangements, we also test the interaction with
the capital openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008).
Independent of the way we measure exchange rate arrangements, we cannot confirm the theoretical
hypothesis.22 In all cases, increasingly fixed exchange rates (i.e., lower index values) together with
higher reserve requirements tend to be followed by higher growth, as indicated by the negative coef-
ficients on the interaction terms. Somewhat pointing in the opposite direction, larger capital account
openness in interaction with higher reserve requirements are also good for growth. We draw from this
set of results that both our results and the theoretical prediction should be taken with a grain of salt.
First, the time horizon at which predictions of the theoretical model hold is most likely shorter than
in our empirical analysis. Furthermore, the theoretical model does not explicitly account for crises,
which may heavily influence our estimation results. There remains a considerable number of systemic
banking crises even if we exclude periods where exchange rates were freely falling.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of reserve requirements on medium- to long-run credit and GDP
growth. Adding to the previous literature on reserve requirements, we employ a large international
panel study. Our Bayesian estimation framework, aimed at explicitly assessing model uncertainty and
incorporating it to our estimates, provides robust evidence on the importance of reserve requirements
for growth, and its effect. In terms of credit growth, previously indicated negative effects of reserve
requirements seem to be short-lived. After five years, we instead find a robust positive effect of
past requirements on current credit growth. In terms of GDP growth, reserve requirements have on
average the expected negative effect of regulation, and although they seem to be somewhat helpful
on average in mitigating the effects of a crisis, their effect is not robust to specification uncertainty in
the economic growth regressions entertained. A nonlinear estimation suggests that medium levels of
22Table A.5 in the Appendix presents the results.
23
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
reserve requirements may in fact be optimal for medium- to long-run growth.
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Table A.1: Variable sources and description
Variable Name Source Description
crisis Laeven and Valencia (2013) Dummy for systemic banking crisis
reserve requirements Federico et al. (2014) Level of reserve requirements, potentially differenti-
ated across currencies and maturities of deposits
gdp growth/capita World Bank WDI GDP/capita growth (annual %)
credit by financial sector World Bank WDI Domestic Credit Provided By Financial Sector
(%GDP)
bank credit to private sector World Bank WDI Domestic Credit To Private Sector By Banks
(%GDP)
credit to private sector World Bank WDI Domestic Credit To Private Sector (%GDP)
gdp/capita IMF World Economic Out-
look
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, Current Prices
investment/gdp World Bank WDI Gross Capital Formation (%GDP)
household consumption World Bank WDI Household Final Consumption Expenditure (%GDP)
govt. consumption World Bank WDI General government final consumption expenditure
(%GDP)
govt. debt (Abbas et al., 2011) Govt. Debt (%GDP) from the Historical Public Debt
Database, updated yearly
inflation, cpi World Bank WDI Inflation, CPI (annual %)
inflation, gdp deflator World Bank WDI Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)
trade openness World Bank WDI Merchandise Trade (%GDP)
capital account openness Chinn and Ito (2008) Capital account openness, based on IMF AREAER,
updated to 2015
era Ilzetzki et al. (2017) Classification of de facto exchange rate arrangements
fdi inflows World Bank WDI Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (%GDP)
fdi outflows World Bank WDI Foreign Direct Investment, Net Outflows (%GDP)
exports/GDP World Bank WDI Exports Of Goods & Services (%GDP)
imports/GDP World Bank WDI Imports Of Goods & Services (%GDP)
reserves (months of imports) IMF IFS Total reserves in months of imports
current account World Bank WDI Current Account Balance (%GDP)
political rights Marshall et al. (2016) Strength of political rights, ranges from +10 (strongly
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
labor force part. World Bank WDI Labor Force Participation Rate, (% Of Total, Ages
15+)
primary education Barro and Lee (2013) Primary Educational Attainment for Total Popula-
tion, 1950-2010
secondary education Barro and Lee (2013) Secondary Educational Attainment for Total Popula-
tion, 1950-2010
tertiary education Barro and Lee (2013) Tertiary Educational Attainment for Total Popula-
tion, 1950-2010
pop. growth World Bank WDI Population Growth (annual %)
total pop. World Bank WDI Population, Total
urban pop. Oxford Economics Population - Urban (% of total)
life expectancy World Bank WDI Life Expectancy At Birth, Total (Years)
pop. density World Bank WDI Population Density (People Per Sq. Km Of Land
Area)
pop. under 14 World Bank WDI Population Ages 0-14 (% of total)
pop. above 65 World Bank WDI Population Ages 65 & Above (% of total)
low-income country dummy World Bank Country dummy, GNI per capita (WB Atlas method)
of $1,005 or less in 2016
lower-middle income
dummy
World Bank Country dummy, GNI per capita (WB Atlas method)
between $1,006 and $3,955
upper-middle income
dummy
World Bank Country dummy, GNI per capita (WB Atlas method)
between $3,956 and $12,235
EU dummy Dummy for EU countries
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Table A.2: Summary statistics of full dataset
variable min mean median max sd Observations
gdp growth/capita -4.485 2.390 2.182 13.880 2.460 475
mean(rr) 0.000 0.087 0.054 0.486 0.096 306
crisis 0.000 0.138 0.000 1.000 0.277 475
mean(rr)#crisis 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.306 0.032 306
log gdp/capita 5.419 8.748 8.666 11.405 1.383 475
govt. consumption 4.080 15.781 15.912 38.678 5.458 475
household consumption 26.184 62.834 61.886 104.064 12.471 475
investment/gdp 5.884 24.191 23.230 48.920 6.101 475
inflation, gdp deflator -6.214 15.152 5.972 582.726 43.258 475
inflation, cpi -0.516 14.378 5.996 411.608 34.476 475
labor force part. 22.494 59.856 59.680 88.187 9.372 475
trade openness 10.950 63.470 53.006 321.084 41.934 475
current account -32.366 -1.477 -1.814 38.704 6.637 475
reserves (months of imports) 0.049 4.359 3.475 33.379 3.619 475
fdi outflows -4.798 1.501 0.366 45.562 3.723 475
fdi inflows -3.206 3.346 2.236 40.410 4.206 475
exports/GDP 5.882 38.066 31.568 218.892 26.085 475
imports/GDP 6.158 40.866 35.050 191.972 25.286 475
bank credit to private sector 3.292 50.784 42.130 183.040 36.627 475
credit by financial sector -57.156 70.313 56.686 338.886 52.747 475
credit to private sector 3.314 55.121 44.422 208.736 41.237 475
primary education 0.200 17.366 16.400 50.560 10.073 475
secondary education 0.540 26.004 23.720 69.600 15.185 475
tertiary education 0.140 7.367 5.740 30.000 5.954 475
political rights -9.800 5.806 8.000 10.000 5.248 475
life expectancy 43.655 70.957 72.316 83.090 7.386 475
pop. growth -1.514 1.199 1.156 5.880 1.139 475
pop. density 1.670 207.943 80.202 7494.225 686.086 475
total pop. 6.680E+05 6.365E+07 1.448E+07 1.351E+09 1.853E+08 475
pop. under 14 13.122 27.982 27.662 49.720 9.776 475
pop. above 65 1.888 8.765 6.704 24.308 5.211 475
urban pop. 5.628 60.379 63.846 100.000 21.840 475
EU dummy 0.000 0.183 0.000 1.000 0.380 475
low-income country dummy 0.000 0.141 0.000 1.000 0.336 475
lower-middle income dummy 0.000 0.316 0.000 1.000 0.438 475
upper-middle income dummy 0.000 0.235 0.000 1.000 0.394 475
capital account openness 0.000 0.568 0.523 1.000 0.357 475
govt. debt 4.220 54.491 47.880 302.660 34.090 475
mean(rr)2 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.270 0.034 306
mean(rr)2#crisis 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.118 0.010 306
sd(rr) 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.283 0.041 306
sd(rr)#crisis 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.226 0.018 306
maxdiff(rr)#crisis 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.492 0.041 306
maxdiff(rr) 0.000 0.044 0.001 0.642 0.092 306
era fine 1.000 8.008 8.000 15.000 3.639 468
era coarse 1.000 2.368 2.000 6.000 1.042 467
era dummy 0.000 0.576 1.000 1.000 0.469 456
era fine rest. 1.000 7.647 8.000 13.000 3.469 456
mean(rr)#era fine 0.000 0.720 0.402 5.197 0.931 304
mean(rr)#era coarse 0.000 0.214 0.105 1.876 0.291 305
mean(rr)#era dummy 0.000 0.051 0.012 0.486 0.083 298
mean(rr)#era fine rest. 0.000 0.660 0.388 4.858 0.840 298
mean(rr)#ka_open 0.000 0.041 0.018 0.355 0.060 306
era fine#crisis 0.000 1.046 0.000 13.900 2.423 468
era coarse#crisis 0.000 0.326 0.000 4.950 0.722 467
era dummy#crisis 0.000 0.073 0.000 1.000 0.200 456
era fine rest.#crisis 0.000 0.966 0.000 13.000 2.254 456
ka_open#crisis 0.000 0.086 0.000 1.000 0.218 475
mean(rr)#era fine#crisis 0.000 0.085 0.000 3.601 0.313 304
mean(rr)#era coarse#crisis 0.000 0.026 0.000 1.282 0.103 305
mean(rr)#era dummy#crisis 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.273 0.023 298
mean(rr)#era fine rest.#crisis 0.000 0.076 0.000 2.728 0.271 298
mean(rr)#ka_open#crisis 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.098 0.011 306
Note: The different reserve requirements variables (mean(rr), sd(rr), maxdiff(rr) and mean2(rr)), as well as the different
exchange rate arrangement indizes (era fine/coarse/dummy/fine rest.) are described in the text. ka_open refers to
capital account openness.
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Table A.3: Coverage across countries and time
Baseline
without crises
and mean(rr)
Baseline
Baseline
without crises
and mean(rr)
Baseline
Country Start End Start End Country Start End Start End
Albania 2005 2015 2005 2015 Lesotho 2010 2015 NA
Algeria 1985 2015 NA Lithuania 2000 2015 2000 2015
Argentina 1990 2015 1995 2015 Malawi 2000 2015 NA
Armenia 2000 2015 NA Malaysia 1985 2015 1990 2015
Australia 1990 2015 1990 2015 Mauritius 1990 2015 NA
Austria 2010 2015 2010 2015 Mexico 1985 2015 1990 2015
Bangladesh 1995 2015 1995 2015 Moldova 2000 2015 2005 2015
Belgium 2005 2015 2005 2015 Mongolia 2010 2015 NA
Botswana 1985 2015 NA Morocco 1990 2015 NA
Brazil 1985 2015 1985 2015 Mozambique 2010 2015 NA
Bulgaria 1995 2015 NA Nepal 2015 2015 NA
Burundi 1990 2010 NA Netherlands 1985 2015 2000 2015
Cambodia 2000 2015 NA New Zealand 2005 2010 2005 2010
Canada 1985 2010 1995 2010 Nicaragua 2010 2015 2010 2015
Chile 1985 2015 1985 2015 Norway 1985 2015 1985 2015
China 1990 2015 1990 2015 Pakistan 1985 2015 1985 2015
Colombia 1985 2015 1985 2015 Panama 1985 2015 2000 2015
Costa Rica 1985 1995 1990 1995 Paraguay 1995 2015 NA
Croatia 2000 2015 2005 2015 Peru 1985 2015 1995 2015
Czech Republic 2000 2015 2000 2015 Philippines 1985 2015 2005 2015
Dem. Rep. Congo 2010 2010 NA Poland 1995 2015 1995 2015
Denmark 1985 2015 1985 2015 Portugal 1985 2015 1990 2015
Dominican Republic 1985 2015 1985 2015 Romania 2000 2015 2000 2015
Ecuador 1985 2015 1990 2015 Russian Federation 2000 2015 NA
El Salvador 2000 2015 2005 2015 Singapore 1985 2015 1995 2015
Estonia 2000 2015 2000 2015 Slovakia 2000 2015 2000 2015
Fiji 1985 2015 NA Slovenia 2000 2015 2000 2015
Finland 1985 2015 2000 2015 South Africa 1985 2015 1985 2015
France 1985 2015 1990 2015 South Korea 1985 2015 NA
Germany 1995 2015 1995 2015 Spain 1985 2015 1995 2015
Ghana 1995 2015 2010 2015 Sri Lanka 1990 2015 2000 2015
Guyana 2000 2005 NA Sudan 2010 2010 NA
Haiti 2000 2015 NA Sweden 1985 2015 1985 2015
Honduras 1985 2015 2005 2015 Switzerland 2000 2015 2000 2015
Hungary 1995 2015 1995 2015 Thailand 1985 2015 1985 2015
India 1985 2015 1985 2015 The Gambia 2015 2015 NA
Indonesia 1985 2015 2010 2015 Trinidad And To-
bago
1985 2015 1985 2015
Ireland 2010 2015 2010 2015 Tunisia 1985 2015 NA
Israel 1985 2015 1990 2015 Turkey 1985 2015 1990 2015
Italy 1985 2015 2000 2015 Uganda 2000 2015 2000 2015
Jamaica 1995 2015 1995 2015 Ukraine 2000 2015 NA
Japan 2000 2015 2000 2015 United Kingdom 1990 2015 1990 2015
Jordan 1985 2015 NA United States 1985 2015 1985 2015
Kazakhstan 2000 2015 NA Uruguay 1985 2015 1985 2015
Kenya 1990 2000 NA Venezuela 1985 2010 1985 2010
Kuwait 2000 2015 NA Vietnam 2010 2015 NA
Kyrgyz Republic 2000 2015 NA Zambia 2015 2015 NA
Latvia 2000 2015 2000 2015
Note: Data availability refers to the two estimations in Table 2.
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Figure A.9: Posterior model size and probabilities, baseline estimation on GDP growth
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Note: The upper plot shows the distribution of prior and posterior model sizes. The lower plot reports the posterior
model probabilities calculated from numerical integration (“exact”) and as implied by the MCMC draws for the 500
models with the highest posterior likelihood.
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Table A.4: Bayesian model averaging results for credit growth, without reserve requirements and credit
bank credit to private sector credit by financial sector credit to private sector
variable pip mean t-stat pip mean t-stat pip mean t-stat
bank credit to private sector 1.000 -0.178 -7.084 0.110 -0.006 -0.990 0.083 -0.009 -1.635
credit by financial sector 0.054 0.001 0.577 0.962 -0.127 -4.680 0.048 0.001 0.499
credit to private sector 0.079 0.003 0.794 0.110 -0.007 -0.848 0.963 -0.163 -7.055
EU dummy 0.419 -2.071 -2.493 0.097 -0.213 -0.817 0.242 -1.019 -2.267
labor force part. 0.085 -0.007 -1.194 0.443 0.101 2.307 0.041 -0.001 -0.507
pop. above 65 0.059 -0.001 -0.031 0.067 -0.010 -0.233 0.022 0.000 -0.012
pop. growth 0.090 0.111 1.369 0.297 0.637 1.824 0.093 0.134 1.742
log gdp/capita 0.057 0.021 0.164 0.087 0.156 0.559 0.026 0.001 0.014
low-income country dummy 0.202 1.327 1.645 0.144 0.890 1.205 0.039 0.140 1.217
pop. under 14 0.152 -0.055 -1.701 0.092 -0.033 -0.940 0.055 -0.010 -0.988
capital account openness 0.184 0.645 1.774 0.090 0.083 0.353 0.048 0.095 1.044
upper-middle income dummy 0.252 -0.714 -1.841 0.138 -0.211 -0.575 0.119 -0.257 -1.698
tertiary education 0.058 0.007 0.689 0.085 -0.019 -0.848 0.039 -0.002 -0.270
lower-middle income dummy 0.185 0.598 1.202 0.132 0.407 0.960 0.048 0.063 0.681
urban pop. 0.104 0.015 1.280 0.134 -0.025 -1.224 0.069 0.009 1.291
inflation, cpi 0.181 0.005 1.023 0.157 0.003 0.607 0.094 0.003 0.897
inflation, gdp deflator 0.126 0.001 0.182 0.120 0.001 0.322 0.043 0.000 -0.225
current account 0.967 0.326 3.873 0.135 -0.028 -1.206 0.901 0.288 3.884
fdi outflows 0.057 0.005 0.656 0.131 0.037 1.264 0.032 0.002 0.456
imports/GDP 0.098 -0.006 -0.203 0.089 -0.018 -0.174 0.096 -0.015 -1.289
life expectancy 0.070 0.006 0.490 0.995 1.004 4.079 0.044 0.007 0.910
secondary education 0.059 -0.001 -0.128 0.147 -0.020 -1.401 0.029 0.000 -0.233
household consumption 0.118 -0.016 -0.463 0.096 0.001 0.014 0.154 -0.029 -1.809
exports/GDP 0.059 -0.002 -0.066 0.081 0.017 0.170 0.054 0.009 1.126
govt. consumption 0.047 0.002 0.068 0.086 0.016 0.150 0.045 -0.001 -0.128
investment/gdp 0.072 -0.003 -0.113 0.095 0.009 0.085 0.052 -0.008 -1.055
govt. debt 0.053 0.000 -0.083 0.101 -0.003 -0.862 0.028 0.000 -0.148
trade openness 0.043 0.000 0.203 0.074 -0.001 -0.317 0.035 0.001 0.390
reserves (months of imports) 0.044 -0.001 -0.151 0.099 -0.008 -0.363 0.026 0.000 -0.079
pop. density 0.079 0.000 -0.879 0.076 0.000 -0.025 0.038 0.000 -0.610
fdi inflows 0.052 0.001 0.087 0.086 -0.008 -0.347 0.016 0.001 0.280
primary education 0.105 -0.011 -1.283 0.107 -0.017 -1.228 0.076 -0.010 -1.755
total pop. 0.066 0.000 0.581 0.076 0.000 -0.509 0.029 0.000 0.381
political rights 0.083 -0.012 -1.126 0.101 -0.011 -0.589 0.024 -0.002 -0.693
Fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 473 473 473
Note: Columns report the posterior inclusion probability (pip), unconditional mean (mean) and t-statistic conditional
on inclusion (t-stat) of the coefficients.
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